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NOTES
Bosh and the Constitutional Cause of Action: The Corridor
to Civil Liberties
I. Introduction
The year 2012 saw 142,976 arrests in Oklahoma.1 Put simply, prior to
Bosh v. Cherokee County Building Authority,2 2012 offered nearly 143,000
opportunities for law enforcement to disregard Oklahomans’ civil rights by
imposing excessive force on pre-incarcerated arrestees. These citizens had
no way, either through statute or judicially created remedy, to recover
against the State of Oklahoma in tort. If the primary purpose of tort law is
to make the victim whole again, it had been derelict in its duty.3 Oklahoma
law had acknowledged a wrong but offered no remedy.
Imagine. Officers are booking you into an Oklahoma jail for a nonviolent
crime.4 You stand at the booking desk, hands in cuffs behind your back,
while the jail employee (clearly in no hurry) methodically plows his way
through the necessary paperwork. Granted, you are in no rush to be booked.
But the jailer’s lack of sympathy towards you—a first time arrestee—is
annoying. Tempers flare. You utter a snarky comment under your breath.
The jailer at your side takes offense. More words are traded. The encounter
leaves you, still with your hands restrained behind your back, on the
ground—battered, bruised, beaten.
You are the victim of an unnecessary, violent attack by a government
employee. You would sue Oklahoma, whose jailer left you with gashes on
your face, bruised ribs, and broken limbs, if not for one problem: the State
of Oklahoma is immune from suit under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort
Claims Act (OGTCA).
This Note examines a citizen’s right to bring a private cause of action
against Oklahoma for violating the Oklahoma Constitution, despite the
existence of state sovereign immunity codified in the OGTCA. Part II
narrates this right’s evolution up until Bosh v. Cherokee County Building
Authority.5 Part III details Bosh’s facts and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
1. OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT: ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY—DECEMBER 2012, at 1-4, http://www.ok.gov/osbi/
documents/2012%20UCR%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
2. 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994.
3. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 2 (2012).
4. Perhaps you forgot to pay for a traffic ticket.
5. 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994.
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analysis finding that a private cause of action exists under the Oklahoma
Constitution. Part IV does three things. First, it demonstrates the now
widespread confusion in state and federal courts regarding Bosh’s scope.
Second, and more importantly, it examines the drastic implications for state
liability and civil liberties that will ensue when the Oklahoma Supreme
Court clarifies Bosh’s holding. Finally, Part IV also houses the thesis of this
Note. Because Oklahomans’ civil rights depend on Bosh’s scope, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court should unanimously acknowledge that the
Oklahoma Constitution provides other private causes of action despite the
OGTCA. This decision will have two effects. First, it will bestow upon
Oklahomans the same rights that many other states already grant their own
citizens. Two, it will promote responsible law enforcement and government
conduct.
II. Law Before Bosh
A. Sovereign Immunity Is Codified: Birth of the Oklahoma Governmental
Tort Claims Act
In 1978, Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims
Act (OGTCA).6 In theory, the Act waives governmental immunity. But in
practice, it provides several instances where the state, its municipalities, and
their employees still enjoy immunity. One such instance is in operating jails
and correctional facilities. Section 155 of the OGTCA provides that “[t]he
state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results
from . . . [p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison,
jail or correctional facility, or injuries . . . .”7 Prior to 1978, the judiciary
had immunized the state from all liability.8 The OGTCA was the state’s
way of voluntarily chiseling away at that immunity.

6. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (Supp. 2014). The Act provides,
(A) The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting
within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, shall be immune from liability for torts.
(B) The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act,
waives its immunity and that of its political subdivisions. In so waiving
immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any rights under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
7. Id. § 155.
8. See, e.g., Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157.
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Then in 1983, the Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the judicially
created doctrine of sovereign immunity in Vanderpool v. State.9 In
Vanderpool, a lawnmower, operated by an Oklahoma Historical Society
employee, propelled a rock into a co-worker’s eye.10 The accident robbed
the plaintiff of her vision, and she sought recovery.11 By overturning the
trial court’s summary judgment to the State, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to immunize the state from tort liability in the absence of a statute
expressly conferring sovereign immunity.12 To the court, the presence of
the OGTCA meant that judicially created sovereign immunity no longer
had a purpose; it was “no longer supportable in reason, justice or in light of
the overwhelming trend against its recognition . . . .”13 And because the
“reason for the rule no longer exists, that alone should toll its death knell.”14
And with that, the Oklahoma Supreme Court discarded the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the OGTCA became the “exclusive
remedy for an injured plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity in
tort.”15
B. Washington v. Barry: The Court Finally Recognizes the Constitutional
Cause of Action
Nearly twenty years passed before the landscape of state sovereign
immunity was again shaken up in Washington v. Barry.16 In Washington,
the plaintiff, a prisoner at a state penitentiary in McAlester, sued the prison
employees under the OGTCA, alleging they used “unreasonable force”
when they removed his handcuffs and leg irons.17 The OGTCA, however,
barred plaintiff’s claim because the Act provided immunity to the state and
its employees for operating any jail or correctional facility.18 But the court
added a caveat: though petitioner had not claimed it, a cause of action still
existed under the Oklahoma Constitution so long as the force was so
excessive that it qualified as cruel and unusual punishment, which is
prohibited by the Oklahoma Constitution’s article 2, section 9.19 Granted,
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 672 P.2d at 1153.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 672 P.2d at 1156.
Id. ¶ 27, 672 P.2d at 1157.
Id.
Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 15, 305 P. 3d 994, 1000.
2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036.
Id. ¶ 2, 55 P.3d at 1038.
51 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (Supp. 2014).
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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Washington’s holding was ostensibly limited to instances where a prisoner
experienced excessive force. But the significance remained: for the first
time in its nearly century-long existence, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that a private cause of action exists when the state violates a
constitutional right.
III. Statement of the Case
In a sense, Bosh is unsurprising. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had
already declared, albeit eleven years earlier in Washington, that even prison
inmates could sue for excessive force under the Oklahoma Constitution’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.20 It followed that a cause
of action could exist for arrestees, or “persons who were not already
incarcerated inmates, because they have significantly broader rights.”21 The
inmate in Washington only lost because he did not bring an excessive-force
claim.22 Regardless, Washington advanced civil rights—an advancement
not forgotten by the Bosh court when it noted that Washington portended
the court’s decision.23
A. The Facts of Bosh
Bosh’s facts do not garner sympathy for the state jailers. And his
experience illustrates the dangers of immunizing certain governmental
functions. After his May 2011 arrest, Daniel Bosh stood at the booking desk
of the Cherokee County Detention Center, a facility operated by the
Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority (Authority).24 His
hands were secured in restraints behind his back.25 He was “[p]resumably”
being booked into the jail, but it is unclear (1) why Bosh was standing at the
booking desk; (2) why he was restrained; (3) what he was restrained with;
(4) what crime he was charged with, if any; or (5) whether he had even
been convicted.26
20. Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039 (finding that cause of
action existed under article 2, section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which states,
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted.”).
21. Bosh, ¶ 21, 305 P.3d at 1001.
22. Id. ¶ 10, 305 P.3d at 998.
23. Id. ¶ 26, 305 P.3d at 1002.
24. Id. ¶ 2, 305 P.3d at 996.
25. Id.
26. Id. Strangely, the lower court had explained that Bosh was arrested for failure to pay
a traffic ticket. Id. While standing at the booking desk, Bosh asked to have his handcuffs
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What is clear is what video surveillance captured next.27 One jailer
approached the restrained Bosh, grabbed the back of Bosh’s neck, and
slammed Bosh’s head into the booking desk.28 But the jailer was not
finished. He placed Bosh’s head underneath his arm and deliberately fell
backwards, causing Bosh to strike the crown of his head on the floor.29
Other jailers joined in and moved Bosh to the showers, outside of video
surveillance.30 The assault continued off camera.31
Bosh’s injuries were severe. The jailers left Bosh to “languish” in his cell
for two days before taking him to the hospital, where physicians discovered
fractured vertebrae and attempted to surgically fuse several of the discs
along Bosh’s spinal cord.32 Bosh is today supported by two rods and ten
screws implanted into his back and neck and has difficulty walking. He can
neither cook for nor play with his two young sons without pain.33
B. Procedural History and Issue Presented
Bosh sued the Authority, the assistant jail administrator, and his attackers
in state court.34 He asserted two types of claims: (1) civil rights claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individuals and (2) state tort-law claims
against the Authority.
The Authority removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss
the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by the
OGTCA. The federal district court granted the motion but allowed Bosh to
amend his complaint to add an excessive-force claim under article 2,
section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.35 That provision, a corollary to
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

loosened, and the jailor initiated the attack. Bosh v. Cherokee Cnty. Bldg. Auth., No. 11–
CV–376–JHP, 2012 WL 3758155, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2012).
27. Bosh’s counsel would later proffer video footage of the attack to local news sources.
Russell Hulstine & Lori Fullbright, Booking Video Released In Lawsuit Against Cherokee
County Jail, NEWSON6 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.newson6.com/story/16320948/bookingvideo-released-in-lawsuit-against-cherokee-county-jail.
28. Bosh, ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 996.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 305 P.3d at 996.
33. Hulstine & Fullbright, supra note 27.
34. Bosh, ¶ 4, 305 P.3d at 996.
35. Id. ¶ 5, 305 P.3d at 997.
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unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated . . . .”36 After Bosh
added the recommended excessive-force claim, the Authority again moved
to dismiss.37 The federal court then certified several questions to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, including, “Does the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30
provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the
limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?”38 In other
words, may a nonincarcerated Oklahoma citizen sue the state under article
2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution—which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures—for damages suffered during an attack by its jailers
despite the jail’s apparent immunity under the OGTCA?
C. The Court’s Decision
The Oklahoma Supreme Court said yes. It first acknowledged the
obvious: the Oklahoma Constitution clearly conflicts with the OGTCA,
which seemingly “allow[s] the state, or, in this case the Authority, to elude
tort liability when its employees beat and injure a citizen who is detained in
one of its facilities.”39 In the face of this conflict, the OGTCA bows to the
Oklahoma Constitution, whose “art. 2, § 30 protects citizens from being
physically abused by the employees of state and local entities that operate
jails and correctional facilities, and such protection includes legal liability
for such conduct.”40
The court then grappled with whether respondeat superior applied.41 If it
did, the Authority was liable for its jailers’ misconduct. If it did not,
recognizing Bosh’s right to sue for excessive force would be futile because
Bosh would not be able to recover from the Authority. The court admitted
that while claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot impose vicarious
liability, “Oklahoma is not bound by the constraints of federal law when
determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior serves as a basis
for municipal liability under a cause of action for excessive force pursuant
to the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30.”42 Besides, Oklahoma already used
respondeat superior to hold municipalities liable under the OGTCA.43 In

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30.
Bosh, ¶ 6, 305 P.3d at 997.
Id. ¶ 0, 305 P.3d at 995-96 (internal citation omitted).
Id. ¶ 7, 305 P.3d at 997-98 (footnote omitted).
Id. ¶ 8, 305 P.3d at 997.
Id. ¶ 28, 305 P.3d at 1003.
Id. ¶ 29, 305 P.3d at 1003 (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶ 30, 305 P.3d at 1003.
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other words, Oklahoma was not required to mirror the federal government’s
standards for governmental liability.
To show that respondeat superior applied, the court rehashed the facts of
Washington v. Barry, where the court first acknowledged that a prisoner
could sue for excessive force under article 2, section 9 of the Oklahoma
Constitution.44 The Bosh court reviewed its constitutional tort jurisprudence
by framing its three observations from Washington. One, the OGTCA bars
tort claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of mental
anguish and emotional distress.45 But, two, prisoners can still sue for
excessive force under the Oklahoma Constitution so long as the force was
so excessive that it qualified as cruel and unusual punishment under the
Oklahoma Constitution.46 And, three, arrestees and pre-incarcerated
inmates have a lower burden of proof for excessive force claims because
they have broader rights than prison inmates.47 Thus, the court’s
hypothetical from Washington served as precedent; in Bosh’s case, the
Authority could not flout responsibility by using the OGTCA as a shield or
by claiming respondeat superior did not apply.48
But the Bosh court then appeared to narrow its answer to the federal
court’s certified question. Article 2, section 30, it explained, applies to
seized citizens, or “arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees.”49 And because
even incarcerated individuals may bring excessive-force claims under
article 2, section 9, “it would defy reason to hold that pre-incarcerated
detainees and arrestees are not provided at least the same protections of
their rights, the same cause of action for excessive force under the Okla.
Const. art 2, § 30.”50 For the first time, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held a
citizen could recover against a municipality for violating his constitutional
rights. True, Washington had recognized that right. But Bosh would
actually be able to impose liability in federal court. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court, however, was seemingly unwilling to recognize constitutional claims
where there was no (1) excessive force or (2) “seizure.”51
So there was hope for Bosh: while the OGTCA barred his tort claim, he
could still sue under article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. (discussing Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶¶ 9-18, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039-42).
Id. ¶ 20, 305 P.3d at 1001.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21, 305 P.3d at 1001.
Id. ¶¶ 16-20, 305 P.3d at 1000-01.
Id. ¶ 22, 305 P.3d at 1001.
Id.
Id.
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Both precedent and a concern for constitutional liberties bolstered the
court’s decision. Precedent held the OGTCA could not “provid[e] blanket
immunity.”52 And to find for the Authority would “render the Constitutional
protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, and a nullity.”53
At the least, Bosh says that Oklahoma cannot immunize the reckless
conduct of its jailers when doing so conflicts with the Oklahoma
Constitution.
Bosh thus illuminated the rights of arrested and incarcerated
individuals—who are no longer “at the mercy of their captors to be beaten,
assaulted, and left without medical attention without any remedy to deter
such conduct.”54 But Bosh left the constitutional rights of non-arrested
citizens to sue under the Oklahoma Constitution in the dark.
IV. Bosh’s Ramifications: Unlocking the Door to Civil Liberties
A. In the Wake of Bosh, Questions Abound
Since Bosh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has delivered only one
clarification: “claim[s] for excessive force, as applied to police officers and
other law enforcement personnel, may not be brought against a
municipality when a cause of action under the OGTCA is available.”55
Draconian? Yes. Commonsensical? Moreso. After all, there is “no rationale
requiring the extension of a Bosh excessive force action” brought under the
constitution when one already exists under the OGTCA.56
But Bosh’s scope is still unclear. For one, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
recognized a citizen’s constitutional right to bring excessive-force claims
against the state under article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.57
Confusingly, though, article 2, section 30 makes no mention of excessive
force, and ensures only that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or
seizures shall not be violated . . . .”58
True, Washington previously acknowledged that prison inmates could
sue for excessive force under article 2, section 9—which also makes no

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17, 305 P.3d at 1000.
Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 1, 341 P.3d 689, 689.
Id. ¶ 19, 341 P.3d at 693.
Bosh, ¶ 32, 305 P.3d at 1004.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/5

2016]

NOTES

629

mention of excessive force.59 Yet that decision at least made more sense
because that provision prohibits using cruel and unusual punishment. It also
made sense because recognizing this right in Washington was not
unprecedented. Oklahoma is far from the first state to recognize a private
cause of action under its state constitution.60 States have recognized causes
of action for a variety of claims, including for illegal search and seizure and
the use of cruel and unusual punishment.61 In other words, it was not
surprising that the Washington court found a constitutional claim for
excessive force in the constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. But Bosh’s reliance on section 30—a provision that makes no
mention of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment—is strange.
And adding to the confusion, the court’s lofty language regarding
constitutional liberties,62 especially when contrasted with its cursory
analysis, calls Bosh’s scope into question.
1.Do Bosh Claims Require an Arrest?
The court’s decision to allow Bosh to sue for excessive force under a
constitutional provision that does not mention excessive force is
undoubtedly odd. But just as curious is the court’s limiting of its holding,
restrictively labeling those who were the subjects of “excessive force” as
“arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees,” rather than those who are merely
seized but not officially arrested.63 Hopefully this phrasing does not signal
the inability of non-arrested individuals to sue for excessive force or that no
constitutional remedy exists for those who are unlawfully searched and
seized but do not experience excessive force.
Perhaps noteworthy is that the Bosh court, in declaring that article 2,
section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force despite the
OGTCA, cites to Binette v. Sabo—a Connecticut case recognizing a
59. Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039.
60. Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages for Violation
of Provisions of State Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619 (2000).
61. See, e.g., Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1998) (search and seizure). But see,
e.g., Giraldo v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008),
review denied, (Feb. 11, 2009) (finding no private right of action for damages arising out of
an alleged violation of the California Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause).
62. Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 (“The OGTCA cannot be construed as immunizing the
state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens. To
do so would not only fail to conform to established precedent which refused to construe the
OGTCA as providing blanket immunity, but would also render the Constitutional protections
afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, and a nullity.”).
63. Bosh, ¶ 22, 305 P.3d at 1001.
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constitutional tort claim for unreasonable search and seizure.64 Bosh
characterizes Binette as (1) creating a “private, Constitutional right of
action for money damages against officials stemming form [sic] alleged
violations of search and seizure and arrest” and (2) “recogniz[ing] that
compelling policy considerations favored the creation of a constitutional
tort to ensure the citizens a remedy when their constitutional rights were
violated by a police officer or similar actor.”65 So unlike Bosh, Binette
recognizes a private cause of action to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures—not excessive force, as Bosh facially does. Though the Bosh
court ostensibly limits its holding to arrestees and pre-incarcerated
individuals, its cite to Binette implicitly suggests that recognition of other
causes of action under the Oklahoma Constitution might lie on the judicial
horizon. Or at least the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agrees; it holds
that Bosh is not limited to excessive force claims under article 2, section
30.66
2. Bosh’s Reasoning: Unique or Unclear?
More perplexing is that Bosh’s analysis, or the lack of it, does not fit the
mold of other state supreme court decisions that have recognized
constitutional rights of action. According to American Law Reports, state
courts recognizing these rights usually pattern their reasoning on section
874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, common law, or analogies to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
where the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a private cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment.67
Bosh, then, is either unique or unclear. It is not rooted in tort law—the
court certified the question of whether a private cause of action exists under
article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution only after the federal
district court granted the Authority’s motion to dismiss Bosh’s state tort
claims.68 This makes sense: because of the OGTCA, Bosh’s right to sue
could not rest in statutory tort law.

64. Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33; Binette, 710 A.2d at 688.
65. See Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33; see also White v. City of Tulsa, 979 F. Supp.
2d 1246, 1249-50 (N.D. Okla. 2013) (discussing Bosh footnote 33 and why Bosh should be
interpreted as providing a cause of action for all provisions of article 2, section 9 of the
Oklahoma Constitution).
66. GJA v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 OK CIV APP 32, ¶¶ 30-32, 347 P.3d
310, 316.
67. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
68. Bosh, ¶¶ 1, 5, 305 P.3d at 996-97.
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Still, the decision could be based on common law—but there was no
mention of any common law right to sue the state. It could be based on
Bivens since footnote 33 acknowledges that Binette is based on Bivens. But
Bosh omits any other reference to Bivens or the right to sue under the U.S.
Constitution.69
Acknowledging that Bosh recognizes a private cause of action is not
enough. More important is the court’s reasoning; understanding how the
court found a private cause of action under the Oklahoma Constitution is
essential to understanding Bosh and discerning whether the court will
recognize additional constitutional claims in the future.
a) No Reliance on the Second Restatement of Torts
Though some state courts recognize a private cause of action under the
state constitution by citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Oklahoma
did not.70 Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts encourages
courts to create a remedy where a statute has not provided one:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by
proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a
civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that
the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the
legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the
provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of
action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of
action analogous to an existing tort action.71
While not dispositive, the court’s decision not to ground its holding in
section 874A could suggest a limited holding. The court might have
realized that if it recognized Bosh’s claim on the basis of the broad
language of section 874A, it would open the constitutional floodgates.
Plaintiffs could then use Bosh’s citation to the Restatement to press many
never-before-recognized claims under statutes and constitutional provisions
that—perhaps deliberately—provide no remedy. But this reasoning is
superficial, mostly because a primary purpose of a constitution is to check

69. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33.
70. Humble, supra note 60, § 3[a].
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: TORT LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF LEGISLATIVE
PROVISION § 874A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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political branches.72 After all, the Bill of Rights (and Oklahoma’s
equivalent in Article 2) is “intended to vindicate the interests of the
individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative
majorities . . . .”73
Perhaps the court thought it better in Bosh’s case to recognize a limited
instance where a claimant might recover for a violation of constitutional
right rather than have its broad analysis used to argue that every statute,
whether it offered a remedy or not, provided a cause of action. In other
words, it was better to methodically expand its Bosh holding in due time
than to abruptly limit its scope months from now to the detriment of an
unsuspecting plaintiff. Regardless, this reasoning contradicts the spirit of
constitutional rights.
b) In Search of Common Law
Also absent from Bosh is any mention of common law. This omission is
troubling, particularly because common law is founded on the notion that a
remedy exists for every wrong.74 That a wrong is a constitutional violation
should only bolster, not undermine, the right to relief. Recognizing this,
some courts find causes of action using reasoning based on historical
common law provisions.75 For example, in determining whether a cause of
action exists, the New York Court of Appeals asks whether its constitution
adopted particular common law principles from English common law and
whether those principles suggest grounds for relief.76 Thus, because the
prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures began with the Magna Carta,
and at common law “[t]he civil cause of action was fully developed in
England and provided a damage remedy for the victims of unlawful
searches,” New York recognizes a similar cause of action under its
constitution.77
It is frustrating that Bosh is not grounded in common law. The English
Crown was not immune at common law. And if the crown could face
liability under English common law,78 then surely Oklahoma’s state
72. T. Hunter Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles: The Case
for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State Governments, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1529 (1997).
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Hibbard v. Halliday, 1916 OK 649, ¶ 8, 158 P. 1158, 1160.
75. Humble, supra note 60, § 3[c].
76. Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (N.Y. 1996).
77. Id. at 1139.
78. Jefferson, supra note 72.
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government should not be permitted to hide behind immunity. If Bosh
signals that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will honor the legislature’s
deliberate decision not to craft a statutory remedy for common law
offenses, its reasoning is inimical to the liberty of Oklahoma citizens.
c) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics: A Potential Framework?
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to bring a private
cause of action under the U.S. Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.79 The plaintiff in Bivens
brought suit under the Fourth Amendment,80 asserting that federal agents
violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizures when they entered his apartment without a warrant or probable
cause and arrested him for alleged possession of narcotics.81 Because Bosh
suggests that neither common law nor tort law provides a remedy, Bivens
provides a blueprint to expand the right of citizens to bring actions under
other state constitutional provisions.
The Bivens opinion is rooted in a rather obvious but rarely acknowledged
notion: a state actor “possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an
individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”82 One
way the Bill of Rights limits this harm is by preventing unreasonable
searches and seizures by federal authority.83 When this right has been
invaded, it is a court’s duty to “adjust [its] remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief.”84 In Bivens’s case, for instance, the Fourth Amendment
demanded that the Court adjust the remedy. The Fourth Amendment, after
all, reaches farther than tort law; it prohibits some conduct that is
permissible for private persons.85 And because of this, “[t]he interests
protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and
those protected by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
79. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
81. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
82. Id. at 392.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
85. See id. (“Our cases have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged in by private persons, be condemned by
state law.”).
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searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”86 Consider: the
private citizen who demands entrance into another person’s home and is
admitted is not usually liable for trespass, while a person “who demands
admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different
position.”87
In other words, tort law intends to regulate the behavior between private
citizens. But this limited purpose should not preclude constitutional relief
when the state acts illegally. Damages should of course be available for
violating the Fourth Amendment because damages are “the ordinary
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”88 The Fourth
Amendment may not expressly authorize a court to impose monetary
liability on those who violate it, but this does not matter.89 As Chief Justice
John Marshall noted, “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury.”90
So the U.S. Supreme Court did not rely on tort law or historical common
law to find for Bivens. Rather, it relied on the civil liberties embodied in the
Fourth Amendment. That the legislature had not afforded a statutory
remedy to its citizens was of no concern. As Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion framed the issue, “I do not think that the fact that the interest is
protected by the Constitution rather than statute or common law justifies the
assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant damages in the absence
of explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy.”91 Congress could
of course create statutory remedies for violations of civil rights.92 But
congressional inaction or the lack of statutory remedy cannot deprive
injured citizens of just compensation.
With Bosh now barring causes of action against the state under tort law,
citizens still need a vehicle to bring claims other than those for excessive
force. Oklahoma should follow other states and adopt reasoning analogous
to Bivens to ensure its citizens may sue under constitutional provisions
other than article 2, section 30.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
Id. at 403 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
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B. The Implications of Bosh
Both state and federal district courts are already grappling with Bosh’s
applicability to other claims.93 This is largely because the scope of
Oklahoma’s Bill of Rights, like the federal one, is far-reaching. The
Oklahoma Constitution’s Article II guarantees freedom of religion (section
5), due process (section 7), and peaceable assembly and petition (section
3).94 It also protects the rights to vote without interference (section 4) and
bear arms (section 26).95 And considering that the OGTCA immunizes the
state from more than operating a jail like in Bosh, the OGTCA and the
Oklahoma Constitution will likely conflict again—this time implicating a
constitutional provision other than the ban on unreasonable searches.96 This
is especially probable because the OGTCA confers broad immunity on the
state; operating a jail is not the only immunized activity. Indeed, if it were,
the constitutional implications of the Bosh decision would be noteworthy
but not momentous.
Instead, the OGTCA immunizes the state from liability for many other
acts of state employees, including: enforcement of a court’s lawful order,
acts of state-employed independent contractors, operation of a juvenile
detention facility, placement of children in foster homes, and the use of
reasonable force and other actions taken by school employees.97
The point is this: Bosh’s tremors will eventually be felt outside of a
correctional facility. The Oklahoma Supreme Court will one day take
another case where the OGTCA and Oklahoma Constitution conflict.
C. At a Crossroads: The Court’s Options Moving Forward
Moving forward, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s chief objective should
be providing clarification to district courts. It could first identify other

93. See, e.g., Koch v. Juber, No. CIV-13-0750-HE, 2014 WL 2171753, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. May 23, 2014) (“Bosh does not serve to create a private right of action for all claims
arguably arising under the Oklahoma Constitution.”); Jackson v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 2014
OK CIV APP 61, ¶ 10, 333 P.3d 975, 979 (dismissing Bosh claim because plaintiff had not
been seized or arrested); Wright v. Stanley, No. CIV-11-1235-C, 2013 WL 6827946, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013) (declining jurisdiction “[g]iven the importance of allowing the
Oklahoma courts to decide novel and significant issues of Oklahoma law, such as the
breadth of the recent Bosh opinion”), vacated by No. CIV-11-1235-C, 2014 WL 1668534
(Apr. 25, 2014).
94. OKLA. CONST. art. II.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. II, § 30.
97. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155 (Supp. 2014).
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places where the OGTCA and the Oklahoma Constitution conflict.98
Granted, the court did not expressly decide that immunizing the state from
liability for operating a jail is unconstitutional per se. But Bosh’s language
suggests it is.99
The court could also limit private causes of action to violations of article
2, sections 9 (cruel and unusual punishment) and 30 (unreasonable force).
Or, it could further narrow state liability to instances where excessive force
was used. What seems more likely, however—considering the court’s
citation to Connecticut’s Binette opinion and its lofty language on
constitutional rights—is that it will gradually expand the number of
Oklahoma Bill of Rights provisions under which citizens can bring private
suits against state entities. It was Bosh’s broad language on constitutional
rights, after all, that persuaded the Court of Civil Appeals that constitutional
causes of action are not limited to article 2, section 30 claims.100
But one legal hurdle presents another. If the court plans to formally
opine, case by case and provision by provision, which specific
constitutional provisions permit a citizen to recover from the state, this
could span decades. Instead, district courts need a standard by which they
can determine if a constitutional provision allows a citizen to sue. Here,
Oklahoma should look to other states.
1. The Self-Executing Constitutional Provision
Bosh demonstrates that legislative obstructionism cannot prevent citizens
from bringing constitutional causes of action. This obstructionism was
futile; Bosh did not need the legislature to act in order to recover.
Essentially, Bosh declared article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma
Constitution to be self-executing. A self-executing provision is one that is
98. OKLA. CONST. art. II.
99. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d 994, 1001 (noting
that “immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional
rights of its citizens . . . would also render the Constitutional protections afforded the citizens
of this State as ineffective, and a nullity”).
100. GJA v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 30, 347 P.3d 310,
316 (“[T]he Court has not only adjudicated a specific claim based upon a set of facts, but
also the Court made a statement of policy (upholding constitutional guarantees and
protections) as its broader holding. The Court then specifically applied that broader policy
statement holding to the facts of the case.”). Still, the Court of Civil Appeals explained that
because “[n]ot every malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance rises to the level of a
violation of constitutional rights,” a court must act as a “gatekeeper.” Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 347 P.3d
at 316.
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effective immediately without the need for any type of implementing
action.101 These provisions bind government actors, and violating them
automatically permits an injured party to sue.102
Other states have identified their constitutional self-executing provisions,
such as those guaranteeing voting rights and the rights to free speech and
press.103 Oklahoma, though, already has standards to decide whether a
constitutional provision is self-executing. But these standards conflict when
applied to Oklahoma Bill of Rights provisions. For example, “A provision
is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation
and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is contemplated to render it
operative.”104 In the case of article 2, no further legislation is theoretically
needed to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Granted, law enforcement—so as to act lawfully—requires courts to decide
what searches are unreasonable. But no additional legislation is needed to
enforce the right.
On the other hand, the court holds that a “constitutional provision is not
self-executing when it merely lays down general principles and does not
supply a sufficient rule by means of which the right which it grants or
reserves may be enjoyed and protected.”105 This seems hostile to the spirit
of constitutional rights; a constitution chiefly aims to lay down general
principles that will govern the legislature. Under this definition, then, no
Bill of Rights provision in the Oklahoma Constitution is self-executing.
Fortunately, Bosh quashes this notion by ruling for Bosh. His case
“center[ed] around” the conflict between the Oklahoma Constitution and
the OGTCA.106 But it also revolved around the tension between
constitutional liberty and the court’s earlier conceptions of what qualifies as
self-executing.

101. Self-executing, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
102. David M. Gareau, Opening the Courthouse Doors: Allowing a Cause of Action to
Arise Directly from a Violation of the Ohio Constitution, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 459, 477
(1995).
103. See, e.g., Laguna Publ’g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 835 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982) (free speech provision of California Constitution); Fenton v. Groveland
Cmty. Servs. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (voting right clause of California
Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 408 So.2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
aff’d, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983) (equal protection clause of Florida Constitution); Shields v.
Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 934 (Vt. 1995) (free speech clause of Vermont Constitution).
104. Latting v. Cordell, 1946 OK 217, ¶ 6, 172 P.2d 397, 399.
105. Maddox v. Hunt, 1938 OK 495, ¶ 9, 83 P.2d 553, 556.
106. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 7, 305 P.3d 994, 997.
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Without expressly saying it, the court declared article 2, section 30 to be
self-executing when it decided that “[t]he OGTCA cannot be construed as
immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the
constitutional rights of its citizens.”107 To shield the state would “render the
Constitutional protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective,
and a nullity.”108
The Oklahoma Bill of Rights contains thirty-seven provisions.109 It
grants thirty-seven rights to Oklahoma citizens—rights that are all selfexecuting in some fashion. Bosh was explicit: the legislature could not
employ the OGTCA to run roughshod over the constitutional right of Bosh
to be free from excessive force. This reasoning should apply equally to
other constitutional rights.
2. Concerns of the State
The court’s faithfulness to the constitution’s spirit is laudable. But it does
present two manageable problems for the state. First, while the OGTCA
caps a plaintiff’s damages, Bosh offers no limit.110 The OGTCA’s ceiling
on damages instead depends on numerous factors, such as who brings the
claim, how many claims are being brought, and the particular state entity
being sued.111 For example, the OGTCA caps damages at “One Hundred
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) to any claimant for a claim
for any other loss arising out of a single act, accident, or occurrence.”112
Thus, if the jailers’ conduct in Bosh had not been immunized under the
OGTCA, Bosh’s damages would be limited to $125,000 for each claim.
Bosh, however, provides no guidance on the state’s potential monetary
liability for constitutional violations. Until the court finds a constitutional
limit on damages, perhaps under due process,113 recovery is theoretically
limitless. For budgetary purposes, the state must know the amount of its
potential liability.
A second concern is whether a statute of limitations exists for
constitutional violations like it does for the OGTCA, which is one year. 114
107. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001.
108. Id.
109. OKLA. CONST. art. II.
110. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 154 (2011).
111. Id. § 154(A)(2).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008).
114. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 156(B) (“A claim against the state or a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is presented within one (1) year after the loss
occurs.”).
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This one-year statute of limitations allows the state Attorney General to
immediately investigate claims against the state.115 The Attorney General
does not have the same luxury for state constitutional violations because
Bosh offers no statute of limitations. Citizens are currently free to amend
their complaints to add or bring Bosh claims years after the actual
constitutional violation occurred. With the constitutional violations having
begun years before, the state lacks notice to investigate the possibly
ongoing improper conduct of its employees. Without knowledge that its
entities are acting unconstitutionally, the state cannot be expected to
discipline or fire its employees. Unconstitutional conduct will continue
undisturbed.
The court should adopt a framework to determine an appropriate statute
of limitations and damages for Bosh claims. Federal courts provide
guidance. When deciding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, they simply apply the
statute of limitations for the most analogous state statute.116 That Bosh
claims are brought under the state constitution should not matter—the
government still requires notice. Likewise, some state courts apply the most
analogous state statute when deciding state constitutional claims.117
Maryland actually applies the statute of limitations for its own
governmental tort claims act.118 Regardless of where the statute of
limitations comes from, Oklahoma needs one.
Second, like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
should adopt a framework for determining a cap on damages, at least for
punitive damages. To decide the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award, the U.S. Supreme Court considers the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct, as well as any disparity between the actual and
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages
awarded.119 For example, an award significantly exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will likely not survive a

115. Id. § 156(C).
116. See Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995); Kurinsky v.
United States, 33 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); Van
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d
463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d
21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1987).
117. See, e.g., Brown v. New York, 250 A.D.2d 314, 318 (N.Y. 1998).
118. Rounds v. Md. Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 75 A.3d 987, 997, cert.
granted, 81 A.3d 457 (2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 109 A.3d 639 (Md. 2015).
119. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-81 (1996).
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due process challenge.120 Should Oklahoma fail to impose any cap on
damages, an award to an injured plaintiff might fall victim to a due process
challenge.
V. Conclusion
With Bosh, Oklahoma significantly advanced civil rights by
acknowledging that the state cannot immunize itself while trampling on the
constitutional rights of its citizens. But to limit Bosh’s scope to prisoners
and arrestees would stall that progress. Immunizing the state for its
unconstitutional conduct undermines Bosh’s lofty language on civil
liberties. Perhaps the most noteworthy early challenge to sovereign
immunity was brought by Sir Edward Coke in the seventeenth century. The
King was not above the law, Coke argued. Rather, the “common law
protecteth the King.” 121 That axiom is no less cogent today than it was
centuries ago. The law protecteth the King. And today, the constitution
protects the people.
Nick Coffey

120. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008) (quoting State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).
121. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 17 (8th ed. 2013).
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